Testing two classes of theories about group induced shifts in individual choice by Burnstein, Eugene & Vinokur, Amiram D.
JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 9, 123-137 (1973) 
Testing Two Classes of Theories about Group Induced 
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The University of Michigan 
One class of theories explains group induced shifts in individual 
choice in terms of interpersonal comparison process. By comparing 
himself with others a member finds out that his position is uncom- 
fortably discrepant, e.g., he is overly cautious or overly risky. 
Knowledge of this discrepancy presumably is necessary and suf- 
ficient to induce him to change his initial choice. Another class of 
theories holds that merely knowing one is different from others is 
unimportant. Shifts in choice occur because during discussion a 
member is exposed to persuasive arguments which prior to dis- 
cussion were not available to him. Two experiments were con- 
ducted, the results of which give considerable support to per- 
suasive-argument theories and none to those based on interpersonal 
comparison: When a member did not know whether others were 
arguing for their own position or were forced to support a position 
contrary to the one they had originally chosen, and the former in 
fact was the case, typical shifts in choice were obtained. However, 
if a member had to argue for a position contrary to the one he 
had initially chosen (and thus he would not be able to muster 
highly persuasive arguments) typical shifts did not occur, even 
though another’s initial choice could be accurately inferred. 
There is a traditional distinction made in the analysis of interpersonal 
influence and conformity which has to do with uniformities in belief and 
behavior due to informational processes versus those due to normative 
processes (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). The former involves the dissemina- 
tion of knowledge among group members regarding an issue over which 
they differ. Faced with a collective choice, members inform each other 
about the merits of their respective position. Information which initially 
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was only partially shared thereby becomes available to all. Consensus is 
achieved when the shared knowledge is persuasive, when it is sufficic~nt 
to demonstrate the superiority of one particular course of action. In COII- 
trast, normative processes describe the impact of rewards and pultiish- 
ments, actual or anticipated, When a person values his membership in a 
group and finds his position on an important issue differs from that of 
other mcmbcrs, he is likely to expericncc a variety of distressful ~~nlo- 
tions-fear of disapproval, of being shamctd, of loss in self-esteem. tbtc. 
The person will then ostensibly abandon his position and shift ton-art1 
the consensus in order to reduce such threats. 
While the distinction between informational and normative proccssc~s 
is not new, its relevance to collective decisions involving “risk” is onl! 
now becoming evident. This is the consequence of somewhat ovcrd~lc~ 
attempts to explain such exotic group induced shifts in choice as thr 
“risky” shift in terms of more general interpersonal processes.‘: The 
present research represents such an effort and considers the informa- 
tional-normative distinction as basic in understanding these effrcts. 
A few reviews have recently appeared on group induced shifts ndricl~ 
raised several important and heretofore neglected points (Cartwright, 
1971; Pruitt, 1971a; Vinokur, 1971a). One is especially significant for 0111 
purposes. Both Pruitt and Vinokur sugqcst that the various thcoricls 
proposed to account for shifts fall into two distinct classes correspondinq, 
we think, to the normative-informational distinction. More precisc,ly, 
therct is a group of theories which asserts that discussion is unnccessar~ 
and insufficient to produce shifts in choice. A member merely nliist 
recognize that his own position differs (in a spccifiecl direction) from 
others, such realization being sufficient to induce a shift. These theoric>s 
thus depend on interpersonal comparisons, althou,~h only one is cast in 
terms of classical social comparison theory (see below). A swond group 
of theories assumes exposure to or participation in discttssion is both 
nchccssary and sufficient. They stress persuasive argumentation and, to 
some extent, differential influence or leadership based ou such argumcrl- 
tntion. A brief description will clemonstratc that these classes of thcoric~s 
make quite different predictions which are readily tc~stable. 
’ Although “risk” is the usual term of reference in the litcsratllrc, as is “cantioll\” 
or “conservative” for another collection of decisions and their com~sponc~inp shifts, it 
ha5 been clear for some time that the person’s response to these items nlay ha\( 
little to do with the concept of risk (or caution) either as defined by (x\eryday 
usage or by decision theory. Merely one exanlplr: the snmr kind of group int111crd 
shifts have been obtained on issues totally unrelated to risk, sllch as the individual’s 
evaluation of DeGaulle (Doise, 1969; Gouge & Fraser, 1972: Slo5rovici & %a\-illlimi, 
1969; Myers & Bishop, 1970, 1971). For convenience sake, hoLyever. the quotation 
marks will be omitted in the remaining text. 
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The importance of persuasive argumentation in group decision making 
was noted some time ago by Thorndike (1938a,b). It has been variously 
used to analyze group induced shifts in choice by Nordhey (1962), St. 
Jean ( 1970)) Stoner ( 1968)) Teger and Pruitt ( 1967)) Vinokur ( 1971a,b), 
and Vinokur and Burnstein (1972). The Vinokur version assumes that a 
particular decision elicits a set of standard arguments in support of the 
various alternatives among which the person must choose. Presumably 
the arguments reflect certain cultural vaIues engaged by the decision. A 
persuasive argument is thought to be similar in effect to that of a correct 
solution in group problem solving: once made, it is very likely to be ac- 
cepted either because it is intrinsically cogent, the member who proposes 
the argument is highly confident of its merits, or both. These phenomena 
have been observed and discussed in a variety of group decision and 
group problem solving situations (Burnstein & Katz, 1971; Clausen, 
1965; Thomas & Fink, 1961; Thorndike, 1938a,b; Vinokur, 1971a). 
The number of arguments available to the average member (or the 
probability of a particular argument) will vary as a function of the 
issues raised by the decision. Thus, faced with a particular choice, a very 
large, a moderate, or an extremeIy small number of arguments may come 
to mind. The extent of the shift in choice a group will induce depends on 
the likelihood that the average member will have available all or most of 
the persuasive arguments. If the likelihood is very great, then individuals 
will have already made their initial choice on the basis of all or most of 
the persuasive arguments. Therefore, not only will they have confidently 
taken a relatively extreme position beforehand, but they also are unlikely 
to encounter new persuasive ideas in discussion, ones which had not been 
considered in making their initial choice. If the likelihood is very small, 
very few individuals will be able to muster strong support for their 
position during discussion, and thus hardly anyone will have a good 
reason for changing their choice. It follows that the largest shifts will be 
induced by group discussion when persuasive arguments have a mod- 
erate likelihood of being available to the average member.4 
Among the interpersonal comparison theories, Brown (1965), Levinger 
and Schneider ( 1969), and Jellison and Riskind ( 1970) assume that an 
individual contrasts his choice with the average choice of other mem- 
bers; and they predict, for somewhat different reasons, that relatively 
moderate choices will be changed so as to be equal to or more extreme 
than this average. Pruitt (1971a) believes the comparison is made with 
the most extreme member, to the same effect. The incentive for shifting 
also varies somewhat from theory to theory. For Brown, the member’s 
* This analysis owes much to Steiner’s work ( 1966) on the optimum &t&ution 
of information in problem solving groups. 
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choice reflects his adherence to cherished social values; an immoderately 
moderate member will change because he wants to demonstrate as much 
or more adherence than the others. Jellison and Riskind define the choiccl 
(of a risk level) as an assertion of ability; because, according to social 
comparison theory, the person wishes to appear slightly morr> able thalt 
others. a shift in choice will be made by the relatively moderate members. 
Finally, Levinger and Schneider, as well as Pruitt, think the nlodcrat(k 
member really wants to take au extreme position but initially suppresses 
this yearning; the observation that others havt~ made extreme choices 
Icgitimizcs the desire and allows the membc~r to shift with impunity. 
Past work on the relative significance of knowledge of other’s positiolb 
and of group discussion had members either discuss without rcvealin!; 
their own choice or reveal their choice \vithout discussing. Thr forrwt 
procrdurc produced sizable shifts (Clark Pf r/l., 1971; St. Jean. 19X). 
However, reasonably accurate infertanccs probably would I)c n~ntlc al)o~~t 
whcrct another member actually stood from what he said in discussiotl 
WCI~ without his making an explicit statctnc~nt to that offcct. With the, 
latter paradigm some researchers haw ol~~cwccl rather weak shifts 
(Clark & Willems, 1969; Tegcr & Pruitt, 196i), while nrost have folmtl 
no shifts at all (Clark et al., 1971; St. J can, 1970; Wnllncl1 l% Kog;ut, 
1965). Hence, although there has beon a good amount of work on dir- 
cussion versus knowledge of other’s choiccl, the matter is still ~mxsolvc~tl. 
The present study takes a different approach to this problem. 111 the first 
of two experiments a subject knows that on some decisions IW ntust 
argue for his own position (ambiguous-for condition) ~(1 on others 1~8 
must argue for the opposite (ambiguous-ajiainst conclitiolt ). Fle is :~IIXIX’ 
that this is true for the other members as \vell. I-Io\vc\,clr. on a11y gi\,c*tk 
decision he does not know who is permitted to argllc- for thclir O\\.II 
choice and who is obliged to support some other position. Thus. ;I snl~- 
ject’s own position cannot be inferred from \vhat 11~ sn!‘s. Th(a sc~~mtl 
experiment consists of only one condition (~~~~aml~iguo~ls-nfini~~st) ; i t,k 
control woulcl merely replicate the standard paradigm for shift in c~hoicc~. 
In this experiment any subject can prccisc~ly tlctc’rminc~ anoth(*r’s rc~l 
prcfercnce because it is always the csact corltrar!, of what 11~1 xl\wc;Itc~s 
during group discussion. 
The theories based on interpersonal comparison predict no shift ill 
choice as long as members remain ignorant of each other’s rrwl prcfcr- 
ence; typical shifts will occur, however, when such knowledge bccomcts 
avnilublc, independent of discussion. ln thr first esperimc>nt thci pcrsolh 
n(~v(~r knows who is arguing for or who is ar,quill,g against their nctwl 
prtrfcrtancr,. ThlIs according to intcrprrsonal cr)tllp;u%oll th(aories. th(-rcs 
should 1~ no group induced shift in choices. In the scum1 ~~qwrirnmt. 
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because a member’s real preference can be readily determined (even 
though it is contrary to the position he advocates in discussion), the 
typical shifts toward risk and toward caution should be observed. Per- 
suasive-argument theory leads one to expect almost the opposite results. 
Note that this theory assumes the individual will initially choose the 
alternative for which he has the greatest number of persuasive argu- 
ments. Hence, when asked to support a position which he had previously 
rejected (in the ambiguous-against and unambiguous-against condi- 
tions), the person is being required to advocate what for him is rela- 
tively unadvocable, that is, to take a position for which he has few 
persuasive arguments. It follows that persuasive argumentation is less 
likely to occur in these circumstances than under conditions in which the 
individual is free to advocate his initial choice (ambiguous-for). Ac- 
cording to persuasive-argument theory, this means that little or no shift 
should be expected in either the ambiguous-against or the unambiguous- 
against situation; typical shifts, however, will occur when individuals 
argue for their initial choice (ambiguous-for) even when they cannot 
infer another’s real preference, that is, they do not know whether he is 
advocating his own position or one quite different. 
Finally, keep in mind that obliging the subjects to argue against their 
own position allows the possibility of certain celebrated counter-at- 
titudinal phenomena. These have little to do with the theories under 
consideration; in fact, they are beyond the scope of either. Changes in 
choice resulting from counterattitudinal processes, e.g., dissonance re- 
duction, would, in fact, create atypical shifts in choice, opposite in direc- 
tion from those normally obtained with these decisions. Shifts of this 
nature are predicted neither by interpersonal comparison nor by per- 




Subjects. A total of 149 male students from introductory courses in psychology at 
The University of Michigan participated as subjects in this experiment. Participation 
was part of the course requirements. Each experimental session lasted for an hour. 
The subjects were run in 21 five-man groups and 11 four-man groups, making a 
total of 32 groups. 
Material. A set of five items were taken from the Kogan and Wallach (1964, ap- 
pendix E ) Choice Dilemma Questionnaire ( CDQ). These were assembled in a 
booklet which was entitled “Opinion Questionnaire.” 
The CDQ items were chosen to include two risky items (items that have been 
found to yield reliable risky shifts), two conservative items (items that have been 
found to yield reliable conservative shifts), and one neutral item ( an item that has 
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been found to yield no consistent si@ficant shift). These items (numbers 4, 6, and 
2 in the CDQ) begin with Mr. A, Mr. B (risky items), and Mr. II (neutral item) 
in our questionnaire. The two cautious items, Mr. E and Mr. F, were taken from a 
questionnaire used by Stoner (1968; numbers 2 and 8, respectively, in his ques- 
tionnaire). These five items were also used by Vinokur (197Ib) in a set of experi- 
ments in which the typical findings were replicated. 
Each choice-dilemma was accompained by the standard instructions to choose- 
between odds of 1, 2, 3, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 chances in IO-the lowest odds of success 
acceptable in order to recommend trying the uncertain (risky) alternative, IN, 
instead, to indicate that this alternative should not be attempted, no matter what 
the odds. In the latter case, a response is usualI>- scored as 10. Choice of risk level is 
measured as the odds that are selected by the subjcact. 
Procedure. Subjects sat at small tables when they arrived at the laboratory and 
filled out the Opinion Questionnaire at their own rate. The questionnaires were then 
collected and subjects performed an anagram task as interpolated activity for about 
IO min while assistants coded their answers to the CDQ items and prepared 
materials for the experimental lnanipulations which were introduced immediately 
before group discussion. Following interpolated activities, subjects were ,given clean 
copies of the Opinion Questionnaire. They were then informed in order to 1)~ sure a 
wide variety of positions were represented in the discussion they \l.ould be told 
privately by the experimenter, beforehand, what position to take. It was pl)intcd o11t 
that often the position they were given to support would be contrary to the one tllc‘) 
had initially chosen. Finally, the experimenter stressed that the subjects werr to 
argue as effectively as possible for the position given to them and that although the) 
were to explicitly state this position at the start of the discussion, they were to re- 
frain from ziving any indication of nhether or not it corresponded to their initial 
choice.’ 
It \vas made clear that the discussion on each CDQ item 1, as to last for 5 min 
and that the experimenter will indicate when to begiu and \vhen to end the dis- 
cussion before moving to the next item. Just before the first discussion each whjrct 
received a slip indicating the position he \vas to take in e\.cry item. Th(, position 
was stated in the usual “chances out of IO” and varied in a predetermined way over 
items (see below). 
Experimental manipulations. The CDQ ‘t 1 ems wrere arranged in the questionnairr 
in the following order: Mr. B, F, H, il, E. Items which typically give risky nucl 
cautions shifts were thus alternated. In half the groups, subjects were assigned a 
position contrary to their choice on the first Opinion Questionnaire for items R, I-I, 
and E, and a position identical to their initial choice for items F and ,4. In the other 
half of the groups, subjects were assigned contrary positions on items F and ‘4. and 
identical positions on items B, H, and E. Sote by ‘*contrary” is meant the mirror- 
image of the subject’s initial scale position; thus, an initial choice of 1, 2, 3, or 4 
out of 10 was assigned 9, 8, 7, and 6 out of 10, respectively, and vice versa. llalf 
of the subjects who initially chose 1 were assigned 9 and half were assigned 10 out 
of 10. An initial choice of 10 out of 10, which meant that the uncertain alternative 
should not be chosen no matter the odds, \vas always assigned 1 out of 10; and 5 
out of IO remained unchanged. Unknown to the subjects, on each item either they 
were all assigned a position which was contrary to their own choice, or they were u!( 
assigned a position which was identical to their own choice. Thus, although each 
’ \‘erbatim instructions are available from the authors upon request. 
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subject knew whether he argued for his own position or not, he could not know this 
for the others. In fact, the manipulations sought to create the impression that 
positions were randomly assigned. 
The experimental conditions are not based on data from different groups but on 
data from the same groups on different CDQ items. Instances in which subjects 
argued for their initial choice constitute the ambiguous-for conditions; instances in 
which they were obliged to argue for a position contrary to their initial one con- 
stitute the ambiguous-against condition. 
After the discussions of all the items were completed, each subject was asked to 
reconsider and to mark what he now felt to be the best decision. 
Finally, subjects were asked to indicate whether (a) everybody in his group 
argued for his position, (b) against his own position, (c) some for and some 
against, or (d) do not know. This was done separately for each CDQ item. When 
this was completed, subjects were given a full explanation of the experiment and 
its purpose. 
Results 
There is no evidence that subjects could reliably infer another’s initial 
choice from the position he advocated during discussion. In instances 
where every member argued for his initial choice (ambiguous-for con- 
dition) only 23% indicated they felt this to be the case; 3% indicated that 
they felt everyone was arguing against his initial choice; 59% indicated 
they felt that some argued for and others argued against their initial 
choices, and 15% indicated they could not tell. In instances where every 
member argued against his initial choice (ambiguous-against condition) 
only 15% indicated they felt this to be the case; 19% indicated they felt 
everyone was advocating his initial choice and 63% and 12% indicated 
they felt some argued for and others argued against their initial choice 
or they could not tell. Given four response categories, 23% of correct 
responses (i.e., responses indicating correct identification of the experi- 
mental situation) in ambiguous-for condition and 15% of correct re- 
sponses in the ambiguous-against condition are well below chance. 
Moreover, internal analysis of the shifts produced by the subjects who 
correctly inferred the relationship between initial and advocated choice 
showed that they were not different from the shifts produced by the 
other subjects. In all cases the shifts of the correct subjects were in the 
same direction as the shifts of the other subjects, and in no case was the 
difference statistically significant. Indeed, in most cases, contrary to what 
would be predicted by interpersonal comparison theories, the shifts of 
the correct subjects were smaller in magnitude than the shifts of the 
other subjects. 
The major results for shifts in choice are presented in Table 1. 
Under ambiguous-for conditions both risky items give reliable shifts; 
one cautious item produces a highly reliable shift while the other gives a 
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Condition Risk) 
Ambiguous-for A 77 3.56 4 17 I6 - .hX 0 tis1 -4io4 .Ol)l 
B 72 5.42 -5.76 16 --.LK O.T,Yl -%.X1 .05 
A+B 149 4.35 4.94 22 --..?!I 0.651 --5.otio Ml1 
Calltious 
I’ 72 5.42 7.76 16 .6S 0 SS!) L’ !I59 01 
I: 77 S.56 S 36 16 “0 0.563 I ii!)7 
F: + F 149 S.49 S.Oi 22 .44 0 770 :; 1 :;*-I .(I1 
Neutral 
H 73 7.26 6.87 I6 .-II 0 697 2 267 ().-I 
Condition Iiisky 
Ambiguous- A 72 4.36 4.'21 I6 1:: 1 050 0.4hl - 
against 13 77 5.43 e5.61 16 -, I!I 0 ‘itis -0.945 
A+B 149 4.91 4.w ::, -.o:: 0 wr -0. 1% 
Calitiorls 
1,: 77 7.49 7.14 l(j 36 1 350 I 00:; 
F 72 Y.10 S.32 16 --.‘L:i 1.161 -0.i60 
E+F 149 7.79 7.71 ::2 .mi 0 SDS 0 ‘LB2 
Neutral 
II 77 5.79 6 74 16 --.!)O 1.06-l -:;.‘-‘XT, 01 
1~ The value of p indicates the risk-level chosen ill terms of p (,hnnc,es o11t of ten. A p IIF :; 
would denote the choice of three rhances (11it of tell 3s the mininllm~ :u~c~ept:lblc prfrl):i- 
bility of success on the uncertain outcome. 
b rE = p2 - pl; negative values indicate shifts toward risk frisky shift ). 
’ p for two-tail t test,. 
shift which approaches but does not quite reach traditional levels of 
statistical significance. There is no sign of such shifts in the ambiguous- 
against condition. A comparison between the overall shift on risky items 
(A + R) under the two experimental conditions reveals that the mag- 
nitude of the shift is reliably greater in ambiguous-for than in ambiguous- 
against (t = 2.768, Pt < .Ol); a comparison between the overall shifts 
on cautious items (E + F) gives a similar difference but at a less robust 
level of statistical significance (t = 1.775, P, < .lO). 
LJnexpectedly, shifts were obtained on the neutral item, toward caution 
under ambiguous-for and toward risk under ambiguous-against conditions. 
Neither persuasive-arguments nor interpersonal comparison would pre- 
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diet these effects. They are curious findings and defy straightforward 
explanation. However, since they weigh neither for nor against the 
theories in question, we will merely note their occurrence and not 
venture to speculate as to their cause. 
On the whole, it is clear that the first experiment gives reasonably 




Subjects. A total of 76 male students from the introductory courses in psychology 
at The University of Michigan participated as subjects in this experiment as part of 
their course requirements. Each experimental session lasted for about an hour. The 
subjects were run in 12 five-man groups and 4 four-man groups, a sum of 16 groups. 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that of the previous experiment up to 
the administration of the first set of instructions. At this point the experimenter told 
the subjects that each time they would all be arguing for a position which was 
contrary to the one they had chosen initially. Several examples were given of 
“contrary positions,” e.g., if 2 in 10 was initially chosen, then the subject would have 
to argue for 8 in 10, if 4 in 10 then 6 in 10, etc., so that the mirror-image principle 
was clear and they could readily determine another’s initial choice from the position 
he supports in discussion. As in the first experiment, subjects were asked to be 
explicit about the position they argued for at the outset and to argue as effectively 
as possible. 
The remaining procedures were again identical to those of the first experiment. 
Results 
The findings from this experiment are presented in Table 2. Again the 
curious shift on the neutral item which, again, we will merely note. 
Neither risky item alone demonstrates a reliable shift; for both items 
combined there is some evidence of a shift, albeit quite weak. In ab- 
solute magnitude it is less than half the size of the shift obtained in the 
first experiment with the identical items under ambiguous-for conditions. 
Statistical analysis also indicates that it is reliably less (t = 1.968, 
Pt < .07). While there is stronger evidence for shifts on the cautious 
items, they all are in the tc;ron, u direction. That is to say, these mildly 
reliable changes in choice suggest the atypical shifts which were 
mentioned earlier as often associated with counterattitudinal behavior 
and as such are not considered to be group induced. Consistent with 
persuasive-argument theory, the typical shift for both cautious items 
combined under ambiguous-for conditions is considerably greater than 
that under unambiguous-against conditions (t = 4.601, Pt < .OOl). Once 
again, there is virtually no support for theories of interpersonal com- 
parison. 
132 BURNSTEIN AND VINOKUR 
TABLE 2 
31~~ INDIVIDUAL CHOICE BEFORE (p,) ,~ND AFTER (p2) UISCUSSI~N AND MICAN 












I< + F 
Neutral 
II 
i6 S.‘s:i 4.07 16 - .24 0. is9 -1.149 -. 
76 5.11 .5 .43 16 - .3j 0 6.54 -1,jgz ~.. 
152 4.47 4.75 ::2 - .L’.FJ 0.725 -1.906 10 
76 7.12 7.72 16 - 63 1 253 -1.894 IO 
76 X.04 S.31 16 --.29 O.S26 - 1 :376 
153 7.5s s.02 32 -- 46 0, 559 - 2 3411 0.t 
76 6.68 7.34 16 - .63 0.96S -2.5% 0.3 
” P indicates risk-level chosen in terms of chances out of ten. 
* 4 = pz - PI; negative values indicate shifts toward risk. 
c p for two-tail t test. 
Discussion 
Theories of interpersonal comparison attribute shifts in individual 
choice to normative processes-the anticipation of disapproval and loss 
of pride or self-esteem were one to maintain his discrepant position- 
which comes into play once the discrepancy is known. Because knowl- 
edge of other’s position is the essential element, it must then be that 
if a member does not know where his colleagues stand, changes in initial 
choice cannot be induced, and if he does know, such changes can and 
will occur. The results of both experiments give no support to this point 
of view. Group induced shifts were obtained when little or no informa- 
tion was available as to the real position of other members (ambiguous- 
for), that is, under conditions in which not only were members pro- 
hibited from announcing their initial choice but also, they were aware 
that the latter could well be quite different from what they were obliged 
to advocate in discussion. Moreover, where it was clear that the choice a 
member announced and defended in discussion was mirror-image of his 
real position, which thus could be calculated, typical shifts in choice 
were not induced (unambiguous-against). 
These findings are, however, fully consistent with the point of view 
that this widely studied group decision situation is governed by informa- 
tional processes as specified by persuasive-argument theory, according to 
which knowledge of other’s choice has little significance and the shifts 
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typically obtained are the result of persuasive argumentation during dis- 
cussion. Vinokur (1971a,b) h as conjectured that a specific decision will 
engage a set of standard arguments that vary in their persuasivesness 
and in their availability to the average number. A member’s initial choice 
is determined by the number and the persuasiveness of arguments which 
come to mind as he weighs the decision, Thus, the extent to which a 
member commits himself to a particular alternative reflects the easy 
availability of many persuasive arguments in favor of the alternative. 
At the same time, of course, it is an indication that persuasive argu- 
ments in favor of the nonchosen alternative are difficult to come by. 
Thus, when (a) the decision elicits persuasive arguments which pre- 
dominantly favor a particular alternative, (b) there is a moderate 
probability of such arguments being available to the average member, 
and (c) members are free to argue for their own choice, as is ordinarily 
the case, shifts in choice will occur following group discussion. The first 
two conditions above need not concern us here. In part, their rationale 
was suggested earlier and a detailed presentation appears elsewhere 
(Vinokur, 1971a,b). The significance of the final condition is perhaps 
rather obvious. Because initial choice indicates the position for which a 
member has a relatively large number of persuasive arguments available, 
to require that he argue for the contrary position insures rather im- 
poverished, that is, unpersuasive, argumentation. Therefore, in terms of 
our two experiments, persuasive-argument theory would lead one to 
expect typical shifts in choice following discussion regardless of whether 
the positions of others are known, if the person is permitted to advocate 
his initial choice. Typical shifts are unlikely to occur, however, when the 
person is constrained to argue for a position other than his own. 
These expectations are reasonably well confirmed, although in general 
the shifts are smaller than those found in other studies, e.g., on the 
average they are slightly more than half the size of those obtained by 
Vinokur (1971b). This might suggest two or more processes at work 
(Pruitt, 1971b), that ordinarily both interpersonal comparison and per- 
suasive argumentation operate to produce the typical shifts toward risk 
or caution. By excluding one of these components, naturally, we obtain 
a weaker effect. The two-process explanation would also lead us to ex- 
pect relatively small but reliable risky and cautious shifts in the second 
experiment where persuasive argumentation was minimized but inter- 
personal comparison was distinctly possible. In general, such shifts were 
not observed. There is, however, another possible explanation of why 
attenuated shifts would be likely to occur in the present study. This 
explanation seems quite plausible and, moreover, assumes only one pro- 
cess at work, persuasive argumentation. Briefly, if a member believes 
others are arguing for a position which they do not really hold, he 
134 BURNSTEIN AND VINOKUR 
treats their arguments with heightened skepticism. In other words, our 
experimental treatment probably reduces somewhat the credibility ( and 
thus the persuasiveness ) of the argumentation. I&~!ause the arguments 
lose their usual force, the shifts in choice xc ncccssarily attenuated. It 
smns unneccsary, therefore, to invoke interpc~rsonal comparison pro- 
WSSC’S (or the lack of such) to account tor th(: attclnuation of the shift. 
Fillally, let us briefly attempt to clarify those curious shifts on cautious 
itc,lns in the second cqerimcnt. It is \vc,ll-known that getting :L person 
to atl\Wxtc a position contrary to what lie bc~licvc3 (ix., to engage in 
countc,rattitudinal behavior) may Icad him at least partly, to accept the 
position he advocates (for example, SW Cxlsmith, Collins, & Helmreich, 
1966; ;ZlcGuircl, 1969). 111 the presclnt stlld!, c&cts of tllis type ~~~ltl 
:q>p~~ as at!/pical shifts. The Jason for this is simpl(~. It has IWCW 
c~st;lblishcd that CDQ-like itenrs which g:i\rc shifts toward a partic~ulal 
cWx~liic~, sav toward risk, also elicit initial choices ~~+ich in gcnc~l tc‘nd 
to fall toxvard that end of the scale. to 1x1 sonIcwhat risky, for example. 
‘l‘lirrs, members initially find odds of slightly less thaII five ollt of tc%rJ ;LS 
nccc~ptnblc on items which subscqucntly produc~c~ n shift toward risk ;u~d 
ocltls of IIZOW than fi\xr out of tcln on itelns \vhich slll)scq~~~~ntly produc(s 
a shift toward caution (WC Cartwright. 1971; :wtl ;IS a C’MC in Point 
rtoticcl this llolds for most valuc5 of /I, ill TalA~s 1 a11t1 2 1. \Vhen in- 
tliviclunls are required to argiw agaiilst tlic+r initi;ll choiw tllis tlwatts 
that on risky items most would bc argui~q for cautiol~, and vice vrrsa 
011 Ci1lltiOllS items. &caus~ of tlissonanw rcdnctioil or soni(~ co~npamblc 
procc~ss, it’ thc>y acccptecl the nqunc~nts the\. UY’W inclucc~tl I-O make. 
thou a cautious shift ~voultl appear on t!rpically rixky items ~1~1 a risk\ 
shift, on typically cautious items. 
1liliil~~ incmbers argued against their on71 choice\ in both eqx7imcnts. 
slich atvpicnl shifts occurred, howcv(~r, onlv in the sccontl. This is not 
totnll!; incsplicablr. In their sc~1rcli for f/jr, conditions which ;tr(t most 
likely to product chan<cs in attitude following countcrattitnclinal lx- 
ha\~ior Carlsmith, Collins, and Helmreich ( 1966) indicate that the like- 
lihootl is fireatcr \vhciI thcrc is pilblic kilOwlccl~,rc of the conntc,rattitutlillal 
act. Such public knowledge \vas n salient featnrt> of tllcl iiiialiil)i,~llolis- 
nqaiiist conclitinn. Vnder ambiguous-ajiainst or ambigiioiis-for conditions. 
it \V;LS not possible for any mcmb~r to know whcth~~r another uxs ad- 
vocntiilq his real position or its contrary.” 
” The atypical shifts do not appear as readily explained l,!, incrntivcy or wlf- 
pcr.\llasion theory as by dissonance theory. The former \wnld swm to demand that 
shifts occur in both experiments, whenever memlwrs engage in coIlntrrnttitlldit-lal 
behavior. LfcGuire ( 1969 ) makes an excellent cwmparison of these t\vo theories ant1 
points out a large number of loopholes whereby finding of this kind may 1~ safcl! 
reinterpreted within either context. 
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Still, why is there no sign of an atypical shift for risky items in the 
second experiment? A dissonance reduction explanation would require 
a shift toward caution in this case. An examination of the average initial 
choices (see p1 in Table 2), however, suggests how counter-attitudinal 
effects might well have been more marked for cautious than for risky 
items, to wit: in terms of their distance from the scale midpoint (five 
chances out of ten), initial choice ( pl) on the former is more extreme 
than on the latter. According to our procedure for assigning a contrary 
position, the scale was pivoted about the midpoint with an initial choice 
of four out of ten being assigned six out of ten (and vice versa), three 
out of ten being assigned seven out of ten (and vice versa), etc. Thus, 
for cautious items, on the average, the position to be argued was quite 
contrary to the initial position, a difference of about six scale points 
between initial and argued choice-from eight out of ten to two out 
of ten for item E as well as item F. Not so with the risky items. A diff- 
erence between initial and argued choice of about two scale points 
obtained, from four out of ten to six out of ten for item A, and virtually 
no difference existed for item B. The implication is clear. Greater dis- 
sonance could well have been produced on cautious than on risky items 
because the advocated positions were more incompatible with initial 
choice in the former than in the latter case. It follows that greater 
dissonance reduction and, thereby, a relatively marked atypical shift 
should have occurred on cautious items. 
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